|By Chinwendu Nwani
Nigeria’s position as the fourth most terror-affected country in the world is not just another statistic—it is an indictment. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2026 released by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the country now sits behind Pakistan, Burkina Faso, and Niger Republic in global terrorism impact. For a nation that prides itself as Africa’s largest economy, this ranking raises uncomfortable questions about governance, security strategy, and national priorities.
The numbers are stark. Terrorism-related deaths in Nigeria rose by 46 per cent in 2025, reaching 750 fatalities. This is not an isolated spike but part of a troubling upward trajectory since 2022. Even more concerning is the context: while other Sahel nations recorded declines in attacks and fatalities, Nigeria moved in the opposite direction, emerging as the only country in the region where both incidents and deaths increased simultaneously.
The report attributes roughly 80 per cent of these deaths to two groups—Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram—underscoring a persistent and evolving insurgency that continues to outpace state response. In total, Nigeria recorded 171 incidents, leaving 243 injured and hundreds of families shattered.
But beyond the figures lies a deeper issue: the normalization of insecurity. When 70 per cent of global terrorism deaths are concentrated in a handful of countries—including Nigeria—it signals not just a regional crisis but a systemic failure. Security analyst Bulama Bukarti of the Tony Blair Institute once warned that “terror groups thrive where the state appears absent or ineffective.” In many rural communities across Nigeria, that absence is no longer theoretical—it is lived reality.
Government officials often highlight military offensives and the elimination of insurgent leaders as signs of progress. Yet, the data tells a different story. A 46 per cent increase in fatalities cannot be reconciled with claims of decisive victories. If anything, it suggests that insurgent groups are adapting faster than the state’s counterterrorism strategies.
There is also the question of intelligence and coordination. Why is Nigeria, with its comparatively larger military budget and international partnerships, lagging behind smaller Sahel nations that are beginning to reverse the trend? The answer may lie in fragmented security architecture, poor intelligence sharing, and allegations of corruption that continue to dog the system.
The human cost is perhaps the most telling. Behind every statistic is a story—farmers unable to return to their fields, children displaced from schools, and communities living under constant threat. The economic implications are equally severe, as insecurity disrupts agriculture, trade, and investment.
Nigeria’s terrorism crisis is no longer a distant northern problem; it is a national emergency with global implications. The data has spoken clearly. What remains uncertain is whether the response will match the urgency of the moment—or whether the country will continue to climb a ranking it cannot afford to lead.
